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 Against Free Exercise 
Reductionism
 By W. Cole Durham, Jr.*
“[O]nly a virtuous people are capable of  freedom. As nations 
become corrupt and vicious, they have more need of  masters.”**
I. Introduction
In my lifetime, which began after the second World War, 
there have been certain moments in which I learned what de-
mocracy was about.  The first came as I watched crowds surging 
through the Berlin wall in 1989.  I was just over forty that year, 
and by then had spent a tenth of  my life in Germany.  I had 
been able to learn at first hand how much Germany had lear-
ned about democracy, and I was as moved by the events as the 
Germans I watched on television.  A second came in December 
of  2004, as I watched the tent city of  Kiev’s Orange Revolu-
tion.  Kiev has long been a kind of  spiritual home for me, in 
large part because of  many friends in that country who have 
worked for religious freedom and the broader panoply of  human 
rights.  A third came when I watched people in Iraq, who had 
been threatened with their lives if  they chose to vote, holding 
up inked fingers in triumph in January of  2005, or later, when 
I met many of  the drafters of  the Iraqi constitution, for whom 
the cost of  working on that document was the daily threat of  
assassination—people who understood that constitutional do-
cuments are written not with paper and ink, but with courage. 
* Susa Young Gates University Professor of  Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham 
Young University and Director, International Center for Law and Religion Studies at 
BYU.  A.B., Harvard College, 1972; J.D. Harvard Law School.  The author wishes to 
thank Peter Petkoff  for arranging this lecture, and Ken Pike, for research assistance 
with this paper.  
** Letter from Benjamin Franklin to the Abbés Chalut and Arnaud (Apr. 17, 1787), in 
MeMoirs of BenjaMin franklin 604 (1834).
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Significantly, our feelings about such moments have little 
to do with the facts of  power.  We are moved not because of  
sympathy with the winner of  an election or even of  a longer 
term ideological rivalry.  And the memory of  such moments 
survives subsequent shifts in power, the return of  normalcy, and 
all too often, disappointment.  These moments transcend poli-
tics.  I believe we are moved because at such moments we feel 
the significance of  human beings taking hold of  their freedom. 
We have learned enough to know of  the incredibly hard work 
that must follow such triumphant moments if  their promise is 
to endure.  But we cannot help feeling the deepest respect and 
even reverence for such achievements of  human spirit.  Such 
moments are forged by particular people, making particular 
choices, but they belong to all mankind, and so hopefully all 
of  us, even those from outside, can be allowed to reflect about 
their meaning.
In my paper today, I want to say something about such mo-
ments and their relation to a puzzle, or a set of  related puzzles, 
about one of  our most fundamental human rights:  the right to 
freedom of  religion or belief.  In the United States, we often 
refer to this as a first freedom, or even the first freedom.  It is 
spoken of  as such not simply because it is in the First Amend-
ment of  the U.S. Constitution.  That, after all, is somewhat of  
an accident of  history.  In some early drafts, it was the third 
amendment.  It is a first freedom, or the first freedom, because 
of  its profound links to the core of  human dignity, to the very 
center of  our normative consciousness, to conscience, to the 
sacrality of  human persons, and to all that calls us to what is 
highest in human affairs.  
But in the very stating of  this right’s importance is a hint 
of  what causes the puzzlement. Why should religion, or freedom 
of  religion, have such priority status?  This is rapidly becoming 
a cross-cultural issue. To be politically correct these days, we 
always speak of  “freedom of  religion or belief,” because we 
know that it is not only religious believers who hear and respond 
to the call of  conscience. We are also conscious of  what Scott 
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Appleby has described as “the ambivalence of  the sacred”1—the 
fact that while the sacred can elicit the highest in human nature, 
but all too often, it has elicited just the opposite—the darkest 
manifestations of  man’s inhumanity to man, and to woman. 
The puzzle I am concerned about today, however, goes to the 
core of  liberal theory.    The puzzle for me has been how to 
defend the claim that religion is special, deserving of  special pro-
tection in the pantheon of  human rights.  Whatever answer one 
might give to the question, “Why is religion special?,”2 how does 
one respond to reductionist claims that the right to freedom re-
ligion or belief  is essentially redundant in a constitutional world 
with robust protections for freedom of  expression (including 
symbolic conduct), association, and strong anti-discrimination 
norms.3  In this paper, I want to describe some possible answers 
to this puzzle.  I confess that articulating answers is not easy. 
I have been reflecting on this for roughly thirty years.4 But this 
is still very much a work in progress, and suggestions will be 
appreciated.  In particular, it is always helpful to have concrete 
examples of  why it is that the Free Exercise Clause of  the U.S. 
Constitution, and the religion clauses of  most other constitutions 
and international human rights instruments are not redundant.
II. The Puzzle of Free Exercise Reductionism
Freedom of  religion or belief  is generally recognized as 
the oldest of  the internationally protected human rights.  It can 
well be called the grandparent of  other human rights, though it 
has become a sometimes neglected grandparent in our times.5  
1 R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of  the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation, 
Lanham/Boulder/New York/Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. (2000).
2 See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accomodation of  Religion 
Under the Religion Clauses of  the First Amendment, 52 U. Pitt. l. rev. 75, 78 (1990).
3 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expres-
sion, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 545 (1983).
4  Marshall, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 545.
5  See W. Cole Durham, Jr., Perspectives on Religious Liberty:  A Comparative Framework, 
in religioUs HUMan rigHts in gloBal PersPective:  legal PersPectives (Johan 
D. van der Vyver and John Witte, Jr., eds., The Hague/Boston/London:  Martinus 
Nijhoff  Publishers, 1996).
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The ideal of  religious freedom was incorporated in the First 
Amendment of  the U.S. Constitution with the phrase, “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of  religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”6  7
Over the past quarter century,  there has been increasing 
evidence of  a reductionist move that argues that “free exercise 
of  religion”—the key phrase in the U.S. Constitution covering 
the protection of  freedom of  religion—has become largely 
redundant in light of  other constitutional developments.  I 
first encountered this argument in an article by Prof. William P. 
Marshall in 1983.8  Essentially, the argument was that if  freedom 
of  speech is interpreted with sufficient breadth, using a broad 
notion of  symbolic speech to cover religious conduct, the free 
speech clause could be used to cover everything that is protected 
by free exercise clause.  
This argument has been given added force by subsequent 
developments.  After the Supreme Court downgraded free exer-
cise protections in 1990 in the Smith case so that virtually any 
neutral and general law could trump religious liberty claims,9 
one could make the argument that free speech provided even 
stronger protection than free exercise.  1011  The better view is 
that freedom of  religion claims should receive protection at least 
as strong as that provided by freedom of  speech, freedom of  
association, and equal protection norms,12 but so long as those 
6  U.S. const., amend. 1.
7  Kauper; McConnell.
8  William P. Marshall, __ Minn. L. Rev. ____ (1983).
9  Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
10  The idea was that strict scrutiny analysis might apply if  free exercise was buttressed 
by another constitutional right such as freedom of  speech or family rights.  But of  
course, where that is the case, the other right alone is sufficient to prevail, so the 
religious right becomes not only redundant but irrelevant.
11  In the Smith case, the Supreme Court explicitly noted that it was not overruling a 
long line of  cases that affirmed the right of  religious communities to autonomy in 
their own affairs (e.g., with respect to church property disputes and internal issues 
such as ecclesiastical appointments).  For an overview of  these issues, see [[[Durham, 
in Seritella volume.
12  See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, ___ Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. (2001).
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norms are available, the argument runs, why is an additional 
right to freedom of  religion necessary?
A more recent version of  this argument has been advan-
ced by Professor Mark Tushnet.13 He asks, “Suppose the Free 
Exercise Clause were simply ripped out of  the Constitution. 
What would change in contemporary constitutional law?”14  His 
response:  not much.  After noting that the scope of  the Free 
Exercise Clause is quite narrow after Smith,15 he goes on to 
document how “other constitutional doctrines protect a wide 
range of  actions in which religious believers engage.”16  These 
include direct protection of  speech,17 bans on coerced speech,18 
symbolic speech (i.e., expressive conduct that is intended to 
communicate and is so understood by others),19 free speech 
doctrines that proscribe viewpoint discrimination, require equal 
access to public resources, or proscribe disparate regulatory 
impacts.20 Also significant are rights of  expressive association,21 
which can help explain legal doctrines such as the ministerial 
exception to legislation forbidding employment discrimination 
(religious groups can engage in preferential hiring of  their own 
members)22 and more generally, the right of  religious commu-
nities to autonomy in their own affairs.23  
Tushnet acknowledges a few areas where coverage may 
be inadequate.  For example, symbolic speech may not be su-
fficient to cover certain activities merely motivated by religious 
13  Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 71 (2001).
14  Id., 71.
15  Id.
16  Id. at 72.
17  Id. at 73-80.
18  Id. at 74.
19  Id. at 75.
20  Id. at 75-76, 80-83.
21  Id. at 84-90.
22  Id. at 84-86.  For a recent case summarizing developments with regard to the min-
isterial exception, see Petruska [[[3d Cir., cert. denied ___ U.S.___ (2007).  See also 
Corporation of  the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,  __ U.S. ___ (1987).
23  See Tushnet, supra note 21, at 85.
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belief.2425  Similarly, expressive association cases may not provide 
full protection to church-related employment cases, because 
American law respects the autonomy of  religion with respect 
to all employment decisions, not merely those in which direct 
religious expression activities are involved.26  But in general, 
he concludes that “[c]ontemporary constitutional doctrine may 
render the Free Exercise Clause redundant.”27
Note that this is not a parochial problem of  American 
constitutional law.  The redundancy problem is likely to arise 
in most modern constitutions, because by and large, these also 
include rights covering freedom of  expression, freedom of  asso-
ciation, and protecting against non-discrimination.28  This is also 
true at the level of  international human rights law.29 Professor 
James Nickel has argued that freedom of  religion is adequately 
covered by a constellation of  nine basic liberties that are widely 
recognized in international law: (1) freedom of  belief, thought 
and inquiry; (2) freedom of  communication and expression; (3) 
freedom of  association; (4) freedom of  peaceful assembly; (5) 
freedom of  political participation; (6) freedom of  movement; 
(7) economic liberties; (8) privacy and autonomy in the areas 
of  home, family, sexuality, and reproduction; and (9) freedom 
to follow an ethic, plan of  life, lifestyle, or traditional way of  
living.30 In Nickel’s view, once this full set of  basic liberties is 
in place, no separate mention of  freedom of  religion is neces-
sary to protect the interests traditionally covered by freedom 
of  religion.31 
For Nickel, this approach has at least four advantages. 
First, it clarifies that no special religious reasons need to be 
given for grounding religious freedom, which has the same 
24  Id. at 76-77.
25  Arrowsmith.
26  See Tushnet, supra note 21, at 86, citing Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of  Singling 
Out Religion, 50 DePaUl l. rev. 1, 20 (2000)
27  Tushnet, supra  note 21, at 73.
28  See, e.g., German Basic Law, Grundrechte.
29  ICCPR, arts. 18-21; ECHR, arts. 9-11.  Plus anti-discrimination norms.
30  James W. Nickel, Who Needs Freedom of  Religion?, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 941, 943 (2005).
31  Id.
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general grounding as other basic liberties.32 Second, it provides 
a ‘‘broad and ecumenical scope for freedom of  religion that 
extends into areas such as association, movement, politics, and 
business,’’33 further underscoring the multifaceted character of  
religious freedom. Third, this approach transcends a clause-
-bound approach to religious freedom that sees its contours as 
defined by the happenstance of  the wording of  constitutional 
and international documents.34 And fourth, it resists ‘‘exagge-
rating the priority of  religious freedom,”35 setting it on a more 
equal footing with other rights.
Free exercise reductionism was given added impetus last 
year in the argumentation used by the Obama Administration in 
its challenge to the ministerial exception in the Hosanna-Tabor 
case. Briefly stated, the administration lawyers took the position 
that long-settled doctrines of  religious autonomy could be trum-
ped by anti-discrimination norms, in part because in their view, 
religious autonomy principles succumbed to the reasoning in 
Employment Division v. Smith, namely that neutral and general 
laws trump religious freedom norms, but also because in their 
view, religious freedom norms provided no greater protection 
than secular freedom of  association norms.  During oral argu-
ment in Hosanna-Tabor, Chief  Justice Roberts asked the lawyer 
representing the government whether the administration thou-
ght there was anything ‘special about the fact that the people 
involved in this case are part of  a religious organization.’ The 
government lawyer responded that ‘there was no difference whe-
ther the group was a religious group, a labor group, or any other 
association of  individuals.’ Justice Scalia responded by exclai-
ming, ‘That’s extraordinary.  That is extraordinary. We are talking 
here about the free exercise clause and about the establishment 
clause and you say they have no special application?’ Even 
former Obama Solicitor General Elena Kagan was ‘amazed’ by 
the Administration’s opinion.  The Court’s formal opinion in 
the case echoed this colloquy. Writing for a unanimous Court, 
32  Id.
33  Id., at 944.
34  Id.
35  Id.
a18 Ed u c a ç ã o & LinguagEm • v. 17 • n. 1  • 11-27, jan.-jun. 2014iSSn imprESSo:1415-9902 • iSSn ELEtrônico: 2176-1043
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.15603/2176-1043/EL.v17n1p11-27
Justice Roberts stated, ‘We cannot accept the remarkable view 
that the Religion Clauses have nothing to say about a religious 
organization’s freedom to select its own ministers.’36  Despite 
the firmness of  this statement, and despite the unanimity of  
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor, the position 
advocated by the government, that religious autonomy deserves 
no special protection beyond what is afforded by freedom of  
association continues to find support in academia and wider 
circles, and threatens to erode religious freedom rights.  This 
is particularly troubling when one realizes that the freedom of  
association rights with which the administration was seeking 
to equate with religious freedom rights are precisely the rights 
that the same voices said should not have been strong enough 
to protect the expressive rights of  the Boy Scouts of  America 
in the heavily criticized Dale case.  That is, the strategy seems 
to be first, reduce religious freedom rights to a secular equiva-
lent, and then give that secular right an equalitarian twist that 
it no longer provides the protection to religion that had been 
provided in the past.
III. Responses to Redundancy Claims
The question, then, is how to respond to free exercise 
reductionism and the redundancy claims that have been arising. 
The redundancy arguments have growing force in our equalita-
rian environment, and I believe pose a genuine threat to religious 
freedom. We are witnessing a paradigm shift from freedom to 
equality norms as the deep structure of  human rights, and key 
dimensions of  freedom of  religion or belief  disappear or suffer 
deemphasis as a result of  this shift.37 Defenders of  religious 
freedom need to be vigilant against these arguments, which 
are being made with increasing frequency around the world. I 
am convinced that in the end the arguments are flawed for a 
variety of  reasons. In general, freedom of  speech, association, 
and non-discrimination norms capture many of  the values of  
the secular enlightenment, but relying on these “children” or 
36  132 S.Ct. at 706.
37  See Durham and Scharffs, Japan paper.
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“grandchildren” of  the deeper religious freedom right risks le-
aving a deeper strata of  values unrecognized and unprotected. 
In what follows, I list counterarguments I have identified thus 
far.  Additional counterarguments are welcome.
A. Redundancy Arguments Further Secularism, Not 
Secularity
The redundancy arguments are virtually always made in 
support of  a secularist agenda, and they typically foster se-
cularism as opposed to secularity.  That is, the concern is to 
advance secularism as an ideology and end in itself, as opposed 
to secularity conceived as a neutral framework welcoming a 
wide range of  world views.  This results in a series of  related 
but equally problematic misapplications of  the ideal of  secu-
larity.  Thus, instead of  being understood as a key to forming 
the framework for a society that is welcoming to all beliefs, as 
well as those without beliefs, secularism becomes an ideology 
promoting secular and anti-religious objectives.  Instead of  pro-
viding a neutral framework, secularism presses to neutralize any 
signs of  religion, particularly in public space.  Instead of  the 
American notion of  separation of  church and state that aims 
at protecting both religion and the state, one get’s French-style 
laïcité, which views the presence of  religion in the public sector 
as anathema.  Instead of  welcoming religion in an open public 
sphere, secularism consigns religion to the private sphere alone. 
Instead of  providing flexible accommodation of  conscience, se-
cularism calls for rigid separation of  religion and state.  Finally, 
instead of  providing protecting substantive equality, recognizing 
that the dictates of  conscience call for substantively different 
treatment, secularism insists on formal equality, and refuses to 
recognize distinctive religious needs.
In most areas, the tendency is toward generating greater 
specificity in human rights norms. Excessive abstraction leaves 
too much room for discretion. This helps to explain why most 
constitutions around the world are much more detailed today 
than similar documents were in the 18th century.  Some see this 
as a loss of  elegance, but in large part it is a result of  increased 
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experience and a desire to clearly resolve known issues.  
Whatever attitude one has toward originalism in constitu-
tional interpretation, this is surely an area where it should not 
be ignored.  Non-originalists sometimes argue for expanded 
interpretation or shifts in meaning over time to adapt to new 
circumstances, but arguing that a provision should simply be 
ignored would seem particularly brazen.
Rights grow in legitimacy with age, particularly when they 
protect core values such as human dignity and the right to fre-
edom of  religion or belief.  Rights have historical associations 
and help entrench clear meanings regarding key protections. 
Different rights, although no doubt providing some overlapping 
coverage, do not necessarily have the same range of  coverage 
and gravitational influence with regard to subsequent cases. 
Sometimes they cover similar cases, but without lending the 
same degree of  weight to the protection. In general, freedom of  
speech and association, and non-discrimination norms, capture 
many of  the values of  the secular enlightenment, but relying 
on these “younger” rights risks leaving deeper strata of  values 
unrecognized and unprotected.
2. Coverage Shortfalls
Marshall, Tushnet, and Nickel all recognize that the free-
dom of  religion right—the legitimacy of  which none of  them 
questions—can only be covered by other rights if  some stre-
tching of  the other rights is allowed.  For example, the absolute 
protection associated with the inner core of  belief—with Forum 
Internum—is not entrenched in other areas. Moreover, the 
conduct dimension of  religious freedom is covered only with 
some stretching of  alternative doctrines such as the protections 
available for symbolic speech. Rights that have different centers 
of  gravity may not allow the same flexibility for doctrinal growth 
that the original freedom of  religion doctrine has.  “Stretched” 
rights are thinner, more easily overridden. Loss of  historical 
reference points means that clear and pivotal cases may lose 
their relevance. Redundancy is an important safeguard against 
such shortfalls in coverage. The following paragraphs identify 
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several potential shortfalls that are easily imaginable if  a separate 
religious freedom right is not maintained.
Reconceptualizing  protections in terms of  secular rights 
may result in reduced coverage. Although the headscarf  cases 
in the European Court of  Human Rights have been dealt with 
under the European Convention’s religion provision, the freedom 
was for all practical purposes analyzed in terms of  secular prio-
rities, and religious concerns were given relatively little weight. 
Removing explicit reference to religious freedom would weaken 
the protections even further. Indeed, whether intended or not, 
treating religious freedom as redundant would send a powerful 
message that religious values have dropped in legal importance.
With respect to the core freedom of  “thought, conscience 
and belief,” should secular thought be the core, and religion the 
penumbra, or vice versa, or should both be regarded as equally 
important?  Religion has more premises than the secular mind 
has thought of.  While philosophical elegance is attractive, 
breadth and depth of  coverage are even more important.  If  a 
particular mental filter is applied, it is too easy to filter out as 
“noise” the substance of  what others are claiming.  Alternative-
ly, other premises often resonate across value systems, earning 
respect and promoting understanding.  We cannot afford to 
arbitrarily exclude some using a criterion of  sufficient secularity.
The autonomy rights of  religious communities is likely to 
be inadequately protected by other rights.  In the freedom of  
association area, one thinks of  the “Bahá’í Case”38—one of  the 
key German precedents in the domain of  religious autonomy 
and the law of  registration of  religious associations.  Under 
German association law applied as normally interpreted, the 
distinctive Bahá’í religious structure could not have been ap-
proved.  One can easily imagine the right to freedom of  reli-
gion being given a similar interpretation, inconsistent with the 
religious community’s right to autonomy in organizing its own 
affairs.  Earlier, in a number of  communist countries, association 
laws required “democratic” governance, so Catholic or other 
hierarchical organizations might not pass muster.  Democratic 
38  Bahá’í Case, German Constitutional Court, 5 February 1991.
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association laws can have similar effect if  they are not construed 
to take religious autonomy rights into account. More generally, 
freedom of  expression and freedom of  association values do 
not necessarily cover neatly the sensitive domain of  communal 
belief  and practice typically covered by religious autonomy and 
self-determination doctrines.39
Freedom of  movement is important to religious commu-
nities for a variety of  reasons.  But freedom of  movement can 
easily be trumped by national security or other considerations. 
In this regard, Nolan and K v. Russia40 is important in recogni-
zing that while nations have a strong interest in policing their 
borders, they cannot use border prerogatives.41  Indeed, national 
security concerns alone, in the absence of  demonstrated con-
crete risks to public health, safety and order, are not sufficient 
to override right to travel claims where religious freedom claims 
are involved.42  The right to travel alone would not be so robust.
Freedom of  political participation is also cited at least by 
Nickle as an area that may provide some overlapping protection. 
The difficulty in this area is that there is too much pressure in 
the opposite direction.  Governments are as likely to restrict 
religions on the grounds that they are dangerous as to protect 
their rights to political participation.  When religious groups 
become a source of  tension, the temptation is to resolve the 
tensions by eliminating pluralism.  The reminder in the European 
Court’s Serif  case, mentioned earlier,43 that the obligation of  the 
state is to protect religious pluralism rather than repress it, is 
an important non-redundant reminder of  what should be done.
3.  Grounding of Claims for Distinctive 
Treatment 
Leaving problems of  inadequate coverage aside, religious 
freedom is vital because it represents a crucial constraint on 
the social contract. It operates in effect as a reservation clause 
39  See Tushnet, supra note 47, at 86.
40  ECtHR, App. No. 2512/04, 12 February 2009.
41  Id., at §§ 62-65.
42  Id., at § 73.
43  See text accompanying notes 19-20, supra.
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to use the language of  international treaty law. In Madisonian 
language, it protects the duty that believers owe to the Creator, 
and as such, it is “precedent both in order of  time and degree 
of  obligation, to the claims of  Civil Society.”44 Dignitatis Hu-
manae is even more explicit. “Religious freedom . . . which men 
demand as necessary to fulfill their duty to worship God, has 
to do with immunity from coercion in civil society.”45 The right 
to religious freedom “is known through the revealed word of  
God and by reason itself.”46 Man should not be “restrained from 
acting in accordance with his conscience, especially in matters 
religious,” because “the exercise of  religion, of  its very nature, 
consists before all else in those internal, voluntary and free acts 
whereby man sets the course of  his life directly toward God. 
No merely human power can either command or prohibit acts 
of  this kind.”47 Religious freedom relates to an order of  obliga-
tion that transcends normal civil arrangements, and accordingly 
deserves distinct protection.
Religious freedom is thus about more than protecting the 
values of  secular enlightenment.  Religious values have distinc-
tive dignity, centrality, and importance not adequately captured 
by enlightenment notions of  freedom of  speech, association, 
and equality.  
Second, expanding on the first point, freedom of  religion 
is not merely about protecting particular ideas and particularized 
communications.  It is about protecting comprehensive world-
-views—the frameworks within which individual ideas and norms 
are born, nurtured, and given meaning.  It is about protecting 
the norm-generating, nurturing, and transmitting process.  It 
protects the seedbeds of  pluralism, generating the ideas and 
social arrangements that give the other rights their content and 
their significance.  
44  Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 5, at § 1.
45  Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 57, at ¶ 1.
46  Id., at ¶ 2.
47  Id., at ¶ 3. 
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VIII. Virtue Ethics, Reverence, and the Distinctive 
Role of Religious Freedom
A final area of  erosion and loss is drawn from the domain 
of  virtue ethics, and in particular, from what Paul Woodruff  has 
referred to as the forgotten virtue of  reverence.48 Woodruff ’s 
argument for renewing this forgotten virtue can be expanded to 
provide a powerful additional ground for explaining why religion 
in general and religious freedom in particular deserve special 
protection. This provides one additional ground for affirming 
that religious freedom is not redundant, but for more impor-
tantly, it underscores society’s deep need to provide protection 
to freedom of  religion and belief.
As an expert in classical Greek philosophy, Professor 
Woodruff  began to recognize some time ago that the great 
thinkers of  Greece attached a significance to reverence that we 
moderns seem to have forgotten.  At the outset of  his book, he 
states, “Reverence is an ancient virtue that survives among us 
in half-forgotten patterns of  civility, in moments of  inarticulate 
awe, and in nostalgia for the lost ways of  traditional cultures.”49 
Reverence is not merely about being quiet in church or, more 
generally, about attitudes of  religious believers.  In Woodruff ’s 
view, reverence is a universal human capacity or virtue.  It is 
evident in the lives of  both believers and non-believers, and 
sometimes, paradoxically, even in the lives of  individuals who 
pride themselves on being irreverent. 
48  Paul Woodruff, Reverence: Renewing a Forgotten Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001). Woodruff  uses the English word ‘reverence’ to translate three Greek 
terms with overlapping meanings:  hosion, eusebeia, and aidos. He notes that in the 
Euthyphro, hosion is often (but he thinks wrongly) translated as “piety,” but this has a 
meaning closer to religiosity, which is not the kind of  ethical virtue intended by the 
term.  Correspondence from Paul Woodruff  in possession of  author, July 5, 2011. 
Woodruff  considers reverence to be one of  the cardinal Greek virtues. See Ursula 
Goodenough and Paul Woodruff, “Mindful Virtue, Mindful Reverence,” Zygon: Journal 
of  Religion and Science 36 (2001) 585-95, 590.  In his introduction to his translation 
of  the Bacchae, he states, “Reverence itself, a cardinal virtue in the period [of  Greek 
antiquity], is most deeply the sense of  holiness that comes over an individual dur-
ing initiation.”  Euripides, Bacchae (Paul Woodruff  trans.) (Indianapolis/Cambridge: 
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1999), xiv.  
49  Id. 
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I want to underscore the notion that reverence as I am spe-
aking of  it is not necessarily a religious category.  Remember the 
feeling of  profound respect I described at the outset with respect 
to the Berlin Wall, the Orange Revolution, or voting in Iraq.  I 
think such reactions were shared by people worldwide, whether 
they were religious or not.  Tore Lindholm has suggested that it 
might be better to talk about conscience, or what Hans Joas has 
referred to as the sacrality of  the person.50 Joas argues that the 
emergence of  modern human rights commitments is linked to 
the sacralization of  the person, but sacralization understood in 
a not necessarily religious way—that is, much as I am unders-
tanding the notion of  reverence.
 As Woodruff  portrays it, “[r]everence begins in a deep 
understanding of  human limitations; from this grows the capa-
city to be in awe of  whatever we believe lies outside our con-
trol—God, truth, justice, nature, even death.  The capacity for 
awe, as it grows, brings with it the capacity for respecting fellow 
human beings, flaws and all.”51  Thus, “[t]he Greeks . . . saw 
reverence as one of  the bulwarks of  society . . . .”52  “To forget 
that you are only human, to think you can act like a god—this 
is the opposite of  reverence.”53  “Ancient Greeks thought that 
tyranny was the height of  irreverence, and they gave the famous 
name of  hubris to the crimes of  tyrants.”54  Woodruff  points 
out that much of  Greek tragedy is really about hubris, the core 
of  irreverence.  It is no surprise, then, that the chorus in Greek 
drama has so much to say about reverence.55  
For these reasons, Woodruff  maintains that “[r]everence 
has more to do with politics than with religion. . . . [P]ower 
without reverence—that is a catastrophe.”56  Power that seeks 
50  Hans Joas, The Sacredness of  the Person:  A New Genealogy of  Human Rights (Alex Skin-
ner, trans., Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2013).
51  Id.
52  Id.
53  Id. at 4.
54  Id.
55  See, e.g., Euripides, Bacchae (Paul Woodruff  trans.) (Indianapolis/Cambridge:  Hackett 
Publishing Company, Inc., 1999), ll. 370-72 (Chorus: “O Reverence [hosia], queen of  
gods, /Reverence, who over earth/spread golden wing . . . .”).
56  Woodruff, Reverence, supra note 99, at 4.
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to manipulate religion for mere political gain, or religion that 
panders to power for the sake of  economic or social gain, is an 
affront to true reverence.
Woodruff  traces this theme through many settings relevant 
to modern society which cannot be explored in detail here.  For 
my purposes, three connected points need to be emphasized. 
Joas would make similar points with respect to the sacrality of  
the human person. The first is that reverence is a virtue that is 
vital for any human society—particularly any democratic socie-
ty—that hopes to flourish.  Democracy provides rich political 
machinery for weaving together the diverse values of  society into 
a harmonious community.  But the output of  that machinery can 
rise no higher than the vision, the dreams, and the aspirations of  
the people.  That which is highest in this regard emanates from 
moments of  reverence in individual lives.  Reverence is crucial 
to moral striving and envisioning that is essential if  democracy 
is to become more than a chaos of  self-interest.  
Second, reverence is the best reminder that human things, 
including states, need to be subjected to limits.  The experience 
of  authentic reverence, widely disseminated in the populace, is 
the best safeguard against the counterfeits of  demogoguery. The 
ideal of  the rule of  law—that we should be ruled by law and not 
men—reflects the two sides of  what we learn from reverence: 
that there are things that transcend the human domain, and that 
human institutions need limitations.  
Third, reverence is particularly vital to the flourishing of  
modern pluralistic societies.  Here reverence is vital in pointing 
the pathway to respect.  We may not fully understand the beliefs 
that other people hold, but we can resonate with their sense of  
reverence, and when we do, we come to respect them in deep 
ways that make pluralistic democracy possible.  Reverence in this 
sense contributes to what Joas calls “value generalization”—the 
process by which one individual’s deeply held values can be 
broadened or articulated in ways that can be shared with others. 
What is needed is more than “consensus achieved through 
rational-argumentative discourse” or “a decision to embrace 
peaceful coexistence despite insurmountable value differences.” 
It is the kind of  sharing, coming from people with deeply di-
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fferent value traditions, such as those who framed the Universal 
Declaration of  Human Rights. A society filled with people and 
subcommunities showing each other such respect can take ma-
ximal advantage of  the synergies of  life in a pluralistic society. 
People with reverence for very different values can nonetheless 
respect each other, and find ways to work together in productive 
and peaceful ways. In contrast, efforts to use state power either 
to impose or to exploit religion can only breed resentment and 
patterns of  distrust.  Conscience coerced is conscience denied.
Religious freedom is vital, and can never be redundant, 
because it protects and cultivates the insights and the wellsprings 
of  reverence. It is not just one among many human rights; it 
is foundational for all the others.  By protecting the space in 
which very different individuals and communities experience 
reverence, freedom of  belief  opens the possibility for dignity to 
unfold and for other rights to take root and grow. It provides 
legal protection for the activities and institutional contexts in 
which the fragile virtue of  reverence can flourish, and without 
which society is imperiled and impoverished. In so doing, it 
protects a dimension of  human existence that the more secular 
values of  speech, association and equality never fully grasp.  It 
has an ontological depth that corresponds to the magnitude of  
the human capacity to feel and respond to reverence and sa-
crality—whether reverence or sacrality take religious or secular 
forms, and whether it is experienced directly or sensed in the 
lives of  others. It draws on the strength and internal resources 
of  religious communities while calling for respect for respect 
for the rights of  others.  It resists the persecution syndrome: 
the tendency of  groups to engage in oppressive behavior when 
they acquire power.  It also recognizes that secular power is as 
prone to lead to the persecution syndrome as religious power. 
It recognizes both the sanctity of  conscience and the limits 
that conscience sets. In the end, freedom of  conviction is vital 
because it facilitates the ability of  human beings to build social 
worlds open to the best that human beings can be and become.
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